Government Employee Disclosures of Agency
Wrongdoing: Protecting the Right to Blow the
Whistle
Questionable conduct by a government agency or officer almost
inevitably comes to the attention of lower echelon employees. Staff
personnel, denied the institutional power to decide what information should be released to the public, may neverthless decide to
disclose evidence of the alleged misconduct. Disclosure may be intended merely to embarrass a disliked superior or coworker or to
further the disclosing employee's own interests. In other cases the
employee may be spurred by his conception of the interests of the
agency, the government, or the public. As employee, taxpayer, or
citizen, he may feel compelled to reveal conduct that he believes is
detrimental to those interests.
But whether the motivation is selfish or selfless, the civil servant who discloses misconduct subjects himself to a variety of possible sanctions by his employer agency, ranging from dismissal, suspension and official reprimand to more subtle measures such as
denial of promotions or benefits. These reprisals may themselves be
motivated by vengefulness or self-interest, but they may serve important and legitimate interests by helping to preserve necessary
secrecy, intra-agency harmony, or employee competence.1 Ultimately, then, in any attempt to define the scope of the rights of
government employees to disclose facts uncovered in the course of
their employment, opposing aspects of the public interest must be
considered. 2 Dissident employees, however motivated, can perform
a critical function by bringing improper agency policies or actions
to light. On the other hand, allowing unrestricted disclosure would
deny government agencies the modicum of confidentiality that is
essential for their efficient operation and might also prevent them
from removing employees whose disclosures cause unwarranted
harm or demonstrate lack of fitness for their positions.
This comment examines the disclosure rights of federal and
state government employees whose job duties confer neither special
privilege nor limitation with respect to employment related discloI See note
2

15 infra.
See generally WHISTLE BLOWING (R. Nader, P. Petkas & K. Blackwell eds.) 1972.
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sures.3 It first identifies each of the various substantive grounds,
both constitutional and statutory, for a right of employee disclosure.
The comment attempts to provide a relatively comprehensive survey of the protection available to a disclosing employee by discussing the overlapping applications of the separate substantive grounds
as they have been interpreted by the courts. The final section of the
comment surveys and discusses the procedural protections that
must be adhered to when the government seeks to sanction an employee for making a disclosure that has harmed his agency's interests. In both substantive and procedural areas, the courts have
reached an uneasy balance between the public interest in favor of
and in opposition to the expansive protection of government employee disclosures.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE

The right of government employees to make certain workrelated disclosures without being sanctioned by their agency employers arises from two distinct sources. The first includes the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and petition. The second
source is the body of federal and state statutes that bar dismissal
of employees except where cause for removal has been established.
The focus of the constititutional right is protection for the
employee's speech activities, while the focus of the statutory right
has become the vindication of the government's interests in restricting other conduct of its employees. The two sources thus present
different aspects of the same fundamental problem-that of providing workable criteria for determining which disclosures are protected and which are not.
A.

Constitutional Protections

1. First Amendment Freedom of Speech: Pickering and Its
Progeny. Public employees long suffered under a status of "constitutional orphanage" 4 that allowed their employers to dismiss
them almost at will. The traditional rationale for incomplete public
Policymakers serving at the discretion of their superiors are thus excluded from discussion. Likewise, the issues of national security and the government's power to compel secrecy
by statute are noted only in passing; for an extensive treatment of that subject, see Edgar &
Schmidt, The EspionageStatutes and Publicationof Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REv.
929 (1973).
See Van Alstyne, The ConstitutionalRights of Public Employees: A Comment on the
Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 751 (1969).
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employee protection was that no right to public employment
existed. 5 Holmes's often-quoted statement that a policeman
fired for political activity "may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman," 6
was applied universally. But in the 1950's and 1960's, in a series of
cases invalidating loyalty tests for public school teachers, the
Supreme Court began to undercut the general doctrine that public
employees necessarily surrendered constitutional rights that could
not otherwise be abridged merely by accepting employment.' And
in Pickering v. Board of Education,8 the Court held that the protection of those constitutional rights extended to protection against
unjustified dismissal for public criticism of a government employer's policies.'
Pickering, a public school teacher, had written a letter to the
editor of a local newspaper criticizing the school board for misrepresenting or failing to reveal the purposes for which the proceeds of a
previous school bond issue were spent, after the school board had
campaigned unsuccessfully for a subsequent bond issue. The Court
held that Pickering's statements, although critical of his employer,
were upon issues legitimately the subject of public attention, and
were therefore entitled to the same basic constitutional protection
as any citizen's comments upon public matters.10 Because the fact
that he was employed by the school board was only tangentially and
insubstantially involved in the subject matter of his letter, the
Court held that Pickering's statements could not be a constitutional
ground for his dismissal; they were either true or, if false, had not
been made with knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity, thus
satisfying the "actual malice" standard enunciated in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan." But the Court also recognized that the state
See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Swan, 41 Cal.2d 546, 556, 261 P.2d 261, 268 (1953).
McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967); see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Publ. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (holding the
denial of veterans' tax exemption for failure to subscribe to loyalty oaths unconstitutional).
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
See id. at 568.
" Id. at 572-73. The Court drew no analytical distinction between disclosures of facts
learned in the course of employment, with which this comment is primarily concerned, and
statements of opinion based on publicly known facts, which may be the more usual form of
citizens' speech protected by the first amendment. But Pickering's letter clearly included facf
disclosures as well as statements of opinion, see id. at 575-78 (Appendix to Opinion of the
Court), and later cases have applied the Pickering rule in situations primarily involving fact
disclosures. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356
F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
" 391 U.S. at 569, 573-74, citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280
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has special interests in orderly school administration that might
justify stricter regulation of speech by its employees despite their
constitutional rights as citizens.' 2 While stating that it was neither
appropriate nor feasible to lay down a general standard for predicting the situations in which a conflicting state interest would outweigh the employees' speech interest,"3 the Court did indicate the
limits of the balancing by suggesting the reasons it did not find such
a conflict in Pickering's case.
For example, the Court noted that Pickering had no close working relationship with members of the school board that might have
been adversely affected by his statements'4 and that despite the
likelihood that Pickering would be well informed concerning school
matters because of his position, the facts he disclosed were not so
within his personal knowledge that they would be difficult to rebut
once they were disclosed.15 The question of whether the existence of
either of these situations would have required a different result in
the case was expressly reserved." The Court held only that absent
any such special interest in restricting disclosure, the government
employee's public statements were to be judged by the standard
applied to public statements generally, taking into account the
strong interest of both the speaker and the public in fostering "free
' 7
and open debate." '
Despite the Pickering Court's express reluctance to set forth a
precedent of broad applicability and its repeated disavowals of any
judgment as to the sufficiency of the special restriction-justifying
circumstances it suggested, its opinion has been taken as providing
(1964). See also Meehan v. Macy, 425 F.2d 469, 470-71 (1968), aff'd en banc, 425 F.2d 472
(D.C. Cir. 1969), modifying 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that the Times test, after
Pickering, was the ultimate standard to be applied in public employee disclosure cases only
where the employee's status in speaking was virtually that of a private citizen).
The Court was wary about applying the Times standard wholesale, since it had been
enunciated in the context of a private citizen's defense to a libel suit by a public official, and
the Court expressly reserved the question of whether a government employee's knowingly or
recklessly false statements might still be protected by the first amendment if no harm could
be shown to have resulted from them. 391 U.S. at 574 n.6.
12 391 U.S. at 568.
'3 Id. at 569.
, Id. at 569-70.
IS Id. at 572. Other special circumstances, including great need for confidentiality, need
for co-worker harmony and discipline, and the fact that an employee's statements are so
without foundation as to call his competence into question, were suggested and dismissed by
the Court in summary fashion. Id. at 570 n.3, 573 n.5, 574 n.6. See also Donahue v. Staunton,
471 F.2d 475, 481 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973) (enumerating all of the
suggestions as stating the limits of the Pickeringrule).
" 391 U.S. at 570 & n.3, 572.
Id. at 571-72, 573.
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specific guidelines for evaluating government imposed sanctions of
employee disclosures. The list of special circumstances has been
interpreted as either suggestive or exhaustive, and with a variety of
contradictory results in particular cases."8 Conflicting interpretations have focused in particular on the Pickering Court's first observation-that, in view of plaintiff's remote working relationship
with the school board, "no question of maintaining either discipline
by immediate superiors or harmony among co-workers" was presented. 9
In Watts v. Seward School Board,2 ° the Alaska Supreme Court
upheld the dismissal of several teachers for their allegedly disruptive public charges of maladministration and improper practices by
the school superintendent. The court viewed the state's interest in
regulating this type of disclosure as significantly different from that
involved in the regulation of the speech of citizens in general 21 since
the disclosure was detrimental to harmony among the discharged
teachers and their co-workers and to the efficient operation of the
22
schools.
A federal district court in Pennsylvania evaluated the disharmony factor more rigorously and came to a different conclusion in
Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. PhiladelphiaPsychiatric
Center.2 The defendant mental health agency justified dismissal of
Rafferty, a psychiatric nurse, on the grounds of "staff anxiety" cre18Courts have, for example, taken different views of how disruptive repercussions should
affect the protection afforded the employee's speech. Some see the disruption element as
decisive in the state's favor. See, e.g., Jannetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334, 1337 (4th Cir. 1974)
(interference with efficiency of public services is the initial determination); Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist., 491 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1974) ("potential" disruption adequate grounds
for dismissal). Others reject the argument that the disruption factor is conclusive in itself.
See, e.g., Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973) (speech must cause "substantial" disruption or hinder the
functioning of the state); Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 71
Cal. 2d 551, 561, 455 P.2d 827, 833, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 728 (1969) (disharmony from clash of
opposing viewpoints cannot support dismissal). An intermediate position is taken by courts
which stress the fact that all the Pickeringfactors must be considered. See, e.g., Mailloux v.
Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971) (guidelines rejected in favor of case-by-case inquiry);
Pred v. Board of Pub. Instr., 415 F.2d 851, 858 (5th Cir. 1969) (factors favoring either side
relevant).
"1 391 U.S. at 570.
20 454 P.2d 732 (Alas. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970). Watts had been remanded
twice by the United States Supreme Court, the second time for further consideration in light
of Pickering. Watts v. Seward School Bd., 391 U.S. 592 (1968), vacating and remanding 421
P.2d 586 (Alas. 1967).
21 454 P.2d at 733.
22 Id.
2

at 735.

356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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ated by her disclosure of substandard conditions,24 which in turn led
to an "antitherapeutic situation" in the inpatient unit because the
staff's anxiety could be felt by the patients. In restoring Rafferty to
her position, the court held that "[t]he First Amendment does not
stop at the hospital door. A hospital.

.

may not.

. .

be permitted

to mask its arbitrary suppression of protected speech behind claims
that such speech creates an 'anti-therapeutic situation' when no ill
effect on patient care has been shown."'' The court admitted that
staff anxiety might have resulted from the disclosures, but held that
"staff anxiety over working with someone who is critical and outspoken, who adds to the dialogue that the First Amendment was
designed to foster and protect," could not furnish a justification for
stifling an employee's freedom of expression.26
The court in Watts placed great emphasis on the fact that the
superintendent against whom the appellants' statements were directed was a person with whom they had daily contact in the course
of their work.2 7 By unduly emphasizing the state interest in maintaining the disciplinary authority of superior officials and by applying a low standard of disruptive or disharmonious effect, the Watts
court may well have under-cut the rights conferred on public employees by Pickering in the context in which they are most useful
and most necessary. Because the most readily apparent misconduct
will often be that of a co-worker or immediate superior, the fact that
the disclosure may potentially be disharmonious or disruptive
should not be sufficient in itself to justify sanctions against the
disclosing employee.?
The Supreme Court ruled in Pickering that the school board
had not demonstrated the harmfulness of the letter upon which it
based its dismissal action since that letter was greeted by everyone
21 She complained in a newspaper interview that the staff failed to protect patients from
homosexual abuse and sexual exploitation both by other patients and by outsiders working
on the grounds, that they allowed patients to keep medication in their rooms, and that they
left signed blank prescription forms to be filled out by nurses on weekends. Id. at 503.
2Id.
at 508.
2 Id. See also Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal.2d
551, 558-59, 455 P.2d 827, 831, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 727 (1969) (holding that the dismissal of a
teacher who circulated a petition could not be justified by the "unrest. . .inevitably generated by the expression of ideas which are controversial").
Watts v. Seward School Bd., 454 P.2d 732, 735 (Alas. 1969).
See, e.g., Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 492-93 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973) (holding that discharge of professor who circulated controversial memorandum could not be justified on mere argument that his working
relationship with the memorandum's target made disruption possible, without showing that
the public employer's "functions are being substantially impeded by the employee's
statements").
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save the board "with massive apathy and total disbelief. ' 2 Justice
White, in a separate opinion, took issue with this emphasis on detrimental repercussions. In his view, once the Court had determined
that Pickering's statements were neither knowingly nor recklessly
false, the question of harm was "clearly irrelevant."3
Justice White may have been disturbed by the prospect that
subsequent cases would fall outside the Pickering rule if a different
finding of fact with respect to harmful effects-equated with effectiveness-were reached. 1 The approach of the Alaska court in Watts
seems to justify that concern. The court in that case concluded with
a minimum of analysis that the letter in question was not met "with
massive apathy and total disbelief" and that the state had a legitimate interest in preventing dislosures which resulted in disturbances to the school system.32 As the dissent pointed out, the majority
equated disturbances with harm, but failed to find any actual harm
to the teaching process itself or the administration of the schools.33
Given the focus of the first amendment on fostering vital public
debate, the standard of proof of harm to special state interests in
harmony and discipline must be substantially higher. 4
In some circumstances the potential danger in permitting disclosure is very great. Restraints upon disclosures by government
employees are easier to justify when, for example, the government
asserts considerations of public safety or national security. Although
"policemen . . . are not relegated to a watered-down version of
constitutional rights, ' 35 courts in disclosure cases have distinguished policemen from other public servants because of the importance of internal discipline in the police force. The balance has
21391 U.S. at 570.
31Id. at 583 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White also
took issue with the Court's "gratuitous suggestion" that when statements are found to be
knowingly or recklessly false, the first amendment may still protect them unless they are
shown or can be presumed to have caused harm. Id.; see note 11 supra; cf. Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
11 Cf. Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees: Times Marches On, 57 GEo.
L.J. 134, 155 (1968).
W5
Watts
v. Seward School Bd., 454 P.2d 732, 735 (Alas. 1969).
Id. at 742 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
3'See text and notes at notes 17, 26, 28 supra.
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). See also Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d
901 (7th Cir. 1970); Flynn v. Giarrusso, 321 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. La. 1971).
The paramilitary structure characteristic of police departments is often offered in
support of this position. See Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1970). See also
Brukiewa v. Police Comm'r., 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970); In re Gioglio, 104 N.J. Super.
88, 248 A.2d 570 (Middlesex County Ct. 1968). For a comprehensive treatment of the first
amendment rights of the police officer, see Note, The Policeman:Must He Be a Second-Class
Citizen With Respect to His First Amendment Rights? 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 536 (1971).
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been consciously tipped in that context to favor the government's
interest in efficient and effective public service at the expense of
first amendment freedoms.
In other cases in which the threat of harm from disclosure was
of sufficient magnitude, the government has been permitted to impose a system of prior restraint to prevent its employees from issuing
public statements, even though prior restraint of the press under
37
similar circumstances would not meet constitutional standards.
Thus, in United States v. Marchetti,3 in which the Central Intelligence Agency sought to restrain a former employee from publishing
a book about the agency, the Fourth Circuit affirmed an injunction
against him, 39 acknowledging that the government had met its
heavy burden of showing potential harm." The decisive factors in
the court's view were the "position of trust and confidence" held by
Marchetti while he acquired the secret information that he sought
to disclose and the Government's need for secrecy in the intelligence
41
area.
The right of government employees to comment publicly on
matters of public concern has its basis in the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech, as does the right of any citizen to comment on public affairs. Although the Pickering Court recognized
Compare New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971), with United
States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). Prior
restraint is allowed in part because it is more effective in preventing disclosures than the
threat of subsequent punishment. See United States v. Marchetti, supra at 1317. In some
circumstances, there may be no subsequent opportunity to impose sanctions. It has been
argued, for example, that the bombshell revelation of American policymaking concerning
Vietnam released by Daniel Ellsberg after he had left the employment of a government
contractor could not be reached under existing federal law. See Nimmer, NationalSecurity
Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REv.
311 (1974).
- 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
", The government, in seeking to enforce the terms of the secrecy agreement signed by
Marchetti, obtained an order from the district court that enjoined him from releasing "any
writing, fictional or nonfictional, relating to the Agency or to Intelligence" without prior
approval by the CIA. Id. at 1311.
"OMarchetti's major line of defense rested on the Supreme Court ruling in New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), which imposed a heavy burden on the
government in seeking to justify any system of prior restraints of expression. Id. at 714. In
that case, the government failed to overcome the heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of an order enjoining the New York Times and the Washington Post from
publishing the classified study on American policy in Vietnam known as the Pentagon Papers.
41 It has also been argued that the Marchetti court may have based its ruling on the
nature of the materials involved and the extent of the public's right to that information; the
Fourth Circuit may have found less compelling an interest in the disclosure of Marchetti's
book than the interest that existed in the New York Times case, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), in
allowing the information contained in the Pentagon Papers to flow to the public. See Note,
51 N.C.L. REv. 865, 869-70 (1973).
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this common constitutional ground, it also recognized that the right
could be outweighed by governmental interests peculiar to the employment relationship. The Court eschewed any general standard
that could be applied in evaluating a public employee's disclosure;
instead, it sketched out the limits of the balance by suggesting
relevant governmental interests that did not exist in that case and
might not even be determinative in a case in which they did appear.
Courts have subsequently applied the Pickering dicta either simplistically or conscientiously, with unpredictable results. Thus, the
scope of the first amendment right of public employees to comment
on public matters remains ill-defined and may depend upon the
balance struck by a particular court in a particular case.
2. The FirstAmendment Right to Petition.When the government employee seeks protection for a disclosure that takes the form
of a petition directed to an agency superior or to a congressman
rather than a statement to the public or the press, the constitutional
provision properly invoked is the first amendment right of petition
for redress of grievances. Very few cases have involved a consideration of the scope of this constitutional protection against employment sanction, but those few have indicated that the protection of
the right to petition may be broader than that afforded for public
statements under Pickering.
In Swaaley v. United States,4 2 decided one year before
Pickering, the Court of Claims held that a navy shipyard mechanic
who was dismissed for having complained to the Secretary of Labor
about improper promotion procedures was entitled to damages. 3
The dismissal had been based on a finding that Swaaley, who bore
the burden of proof at his discharge hearing, had failed to corroborate the allegations of graft and favoritism he made in his letter."
The court refused to permit dismissals to be based on such a standard because of the danger that employees' beliefs of agency
wrongdoing would be suppressed by self-censorship, to the detriment of the general public interest in effective government." The
court applied the New York Times standard instead," holding that
the employee was entitled to first amendment protection against
sanction even for false and defamatory statements, so long as they
were made in the course of a petition submitted to an agency supe42

376 F.2d 857 (Ct. C1. 1967).

13Id.
11Id.
'1 Id.
11Id.

at
at
at
at

867.
860-61.
861-62.
863.
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rior 7 who the employee believed had the power to redress his grievance, 48 and so long as the statements were not made with knowledge
or reckless disregard of their falsity.49
Subsequent cases in the Court of Claims as well as in other
courts have referred to Swaaley for the proposition that only the'
New York Times standard limits the right of government employees
to petition for redress of grievances through agency channels," and
have indicated further that this holding is consistent with
Pickering." That test, however, would provide potentially greater
protection for employees who disclose wrongdoing by petition than
for those who make public statements disclosing the same wrongdoing. Under Pickering, the New York Times test is only applied in
cases in which disclosures are not different from those a private
citizen would make, or in which special interests related to the
speaker's employment relationship are not affected.5 2 That is, even
if a disclosure were not maliciously made, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Pickering might allow sanctions to be imposed because
of harm to governmental interests in confidentiality, discipline,
harmony, or loyalty.-3 But if the New York Times standard is the
only standard to be applied in evaluating governmental sanctions
under the first amendment guarantee of freedom of petition, a single
disclosure that is deleterious to the governmental interests enumerated in Pickering might be protected if it took the form of a letter
to an agency superior but not if it took the form of a letter to a
newspaper editor."
" The court specifically declined to consider the standard for petitions directed to members of Congress, which are protected under a broadly worded statute. Id. But the constitutional protection for such petitions should certainly be no less than that applied in Swaaley,
and the statute may provide even more. See note 100 infra.
4A See Ruderer v. United States, 412 F.2d 1285, 1291 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
914 (1970) (explaining prior holding in Swaaley).
4, Swaaley v. United States, 376 F.2d 857, 863 (Ct. Cl. 1967), citing New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
" See, e.g., Meehan v. Macy, 425 F.2d 463, 471 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1968), aff'd en banc,
425 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Ianarelli v. Morton, 327 F. Supp. 873, 886-88 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Ruderer v. United States, 412 F.2d 1285, 1290 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970).
See also Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees: Times Marches On, 57 GEO.
L.J. 134, 144 (1968).
5, See Meehan v. Macy, 425 F.2d 469, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1968), affd en banc, 425 F.2d 472
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Jackson v. United States, 428 F.2d 844, 846 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
5' See text at notes 10-13 supra.

See text and notes at notes 12-17 supra.
s' In one respect, the Swaaley rule is not consistent with Pickering's application of the
New York Times test. The Supreme Court indicated that its holding in Pickering was based
4n part on the remoteness of Pickering'spublic statements from his employment relationship
and their similarity to comments that might have been made by members of the general
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This implication of the Swaaley holding might be justified on
the ground that the level of harm to governmental interests caused
by petitions through agency channels can be presumed to be too low
in any case to justify the imposition of sanctions on an employee's
petition.-" Taken generally, this proposition may seem correct. No
governmental interests in intra-agency confidentiality are breached
by a petition, and an agency head is able to respond to a petition
complaining of wrongdoing in the manner that seems most appropriate in light of his knowledge of other relevant facts and of his
commitment to the agency's best interests. As the court in Swaaley
noted, "a petition, properly so-called, that has never left a Department need do no harm."56 The District of Columbia Circuit recently
indicated a similar view in Ring v. Schlesinger,17 in which it held
that the record in the case did not support the district court's conclusion that all of the governmental interests suggested in Pickering
were present." The court of appeals noted, referring to Swaaley,
that the employee in Ring had submitted her grievance only to a few
of her superiors and one outsider who had not responded, thus differentiating the situation from Pickering's published letter.59
The presumption seems dubious, however, when viewed in light
of some of the specific interests noted in Pickering.For example, the
discipline of agency employees and harmony among coworkers
might be affected as much by a disclosing petition as by a public
statement. 0 One judge dissented in Ring on the ground that the
complaining employee's statements, though not widely broadcast,
did have the definite effect of aggravating friction and discord
among her co-workers. 1
public. See text at note 11 supra. When a government employee petitions a superior for
redress of a grievance, however, his statements are likely to be directly related to his employment. If the rationale for applying the Times test in Pickering were limited to the public
citizen analogy, the Swaaley rule of applying it in every petition case would not seem justified. 5
See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 570 (1970); cf. Note, Dismissals of Public Employees for PetitioningCongress: Administrative Discipline and 5 U.S. C.
Section 652(d), 74 YALE L.J. 1156, 1169-70 (1965) [hereinafter cited as YALE NOTE].
11 376 F.2d at 863. See also id. at 862 (suggesting that harm would only result from
dissemination of a petition, and that the fault lies with the recipient rather than the petitioner
if such harm results).
57502 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 488.
Id. at 489.
so Cf. YALE NOTE, supra note 55, at 1169-70.
" 502 F.2d at 494-95 (Robb, J., dissenting). But see Ianarelli v. Morton, 327 F. Supp.
873, 888 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (holding that solicitation of petitions was subject only to the Swaaley
test even though actual "disaffection and dissension" was shown).
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The Swaaley rule thus might be read as guaranteeing broader
protection than Pickering would require for public employee
disclosures of agency wrongdoing that take the form of petitions
rather than statements to the public or the press. If this interpretation of Swaaley is authoritatively adopted, intra-agency petitions
would be the more effective means of reform and disclosure by government employees. 2 The public interest in the self-policing of
agency misfeasance will be given precedence over the agency's interests in efficient operation insofar as dissention or disharmony resulting from a petition is not permitted to justify sanction. Of course,
this higher level of protection would apply only to the specific class
of disclosures that can be defined as petitions for redress of grievances.13 When a petition is accompanied by other intra- or extraagency statements or actions, or when the Swaaley-New York Times
standard is not met because the petition is malicious,64 the disclosing employee's discharge may be justified.
3. First Amendment ProtectionAgainst Vague or Overbroad
Nondisclosure Rules. A final constitutional doctrine that creates
substantive protection for government employee disclosures is the
two-edged prohibition against rules that are vague or overbroad.
The overbreadth doctrine has developed to protect the exercise of
first amendment rights that might otherwise be inhibited. It has
been applied in a variety of situations under the rationale that a rule
that on its face prohibits both protected and unprotected first
amendment activity has a deterrent impact on persons who contemplate prohibited activity but are uncertain whether they can raise
the first amendment's protection successfully against the application of the rule to them.6 5 The vagueness doctrine is closely related,
but the inhibiting effect of a vague rule stems from uncertainty as
to what activity the rule prohibits.6" Thus, even plaintiffs whose
,2There may be cases in which petition for redress of grievances is an ineffective or
inappropriate vehicle for making a particular disclosure. Public statements designed to bring
public pressure to bear on the agency when the employee seeks to correct what he perceives
as agency wrongdoing would, of course, be subject to Pickeringstandards.
1 It would not extend, for example, to statements outside channels made by an employee
who also files a petition making the same disclosure.
" See Ruderer v. United States, 412 F.2d 1285 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914
(1970).
, See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
432-33 (1963); Note, The FirstAmendment Over-breadthDoctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 884, 853
(1970) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD NoTE].
U The vagueness doctrine, which has its roots in due process concepts of fair notice, is
distinguishable from overbreadth in the abstract; the question for an individual confronted
by a vague statute is whether his action is prohibited by the statute, while the question raised
by an overbroad statute is whether the individual's action, though clearly prohibited by the
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activities might constitutionally be restricted by a properly drawn
rule may avoid that restriction in some cases where the rule under
which they are sanctioned can be attacked as vague or overbroad.
A government employee making a disclosure that would justify dismissal or other sanction under Pickering or Swaaley, then, might
still be constitutionally protected from any retaliatory action imposed under a vague or overbroad nondisclosure rule.
In Muller v. Conlisk,67 for example, a detective of the Chicago
Police Department challenged a departmental rule that prohibited
all statements by policemen that were "derogatory to the Department or any member or policy of the Department.""8 The Seventh
Circuit invalidated the rule and the sanction that had been imposed
on Muller for his statements to the press concerning the Department's Internal Inspection Division.69 The court took note of the
Department's argument that because Muller was a police officer,
the interests of his employer in restricting his speech were greater
than those recognized in Pickering, but concluded that the additional interest only affected the balancing to be undertaken in a
particular case and did not eliminate Muller's right to criticize his
employer entirely. 7 Whether or not Muller's particular statements
would have survived the ultimate balancing under Pickering, the
departmental rule was unconstitutional on its face because it prohibited all criticism. 71
The vagueness doctrine was the ground for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bence v. Breier,72 a case involving the reprimand
of two Milwaukee police officers for making false statements in a
letter critical of certain Milwaukee Police Department employee
compensation practices. The disciplined employees, officers of the
policemen's union, had sent the letter to the city's labor negotiator
and posted it on union bulletin boards in connection with a collective bargaining agreement term currently under negotiation. The
Department's reprimand was imposed under a departmental rule
statute, would be protected from sanction by its constitutional status. In cases involving first
amendment activity, the application and rationale for the two doctrines may merge. See
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
432-33 (1963); HARVARD NoTE, supra note 65, at 871-75.
67429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 902.
Id. at 902-03.
70 Id. at 904.
"

7' Id. But cf. Partnow v. Moran, 359 F. Supp. 519 (D. Del. 1973) (district court, presented
with vagueness and overbreadth challenges to a rule under which disclosing employee was
dismissed, abstained pending potentially narrowing interpretation of rule in state court suit).
72 501 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1974).
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prohibiting conduct "unbecoming a member and detrimental to the
service. 7 3 The court held that since this rule was unnecessarily
vague in its scope, and since it therefore might apply to activities
that involved speech by government employees, it unconstitutionally deterred protected speech to the same extent as if it were
74
clear in its scope but overbroad.
For federal civil service employees and many state governmental employees, the statutes generally covering sanctions for improper behavior require the government employer to show "cause" or
"just cause" or the like. 7' The Supreme Court recently considered
vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the federal statute in
Arnett v. Kennedy. 71 Despite the fractionalization of the Court on
the separate issue of the procedures necessary for dismissing a federal employee under the statute, 77 five Justices joined Justice
Rehnquist in holding that the standard of "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service" was neither unconstitutionally
vague nor overbroad. 71 Justice Rehnquist's opinion first stressed the
difficulties of defining with great specificity a single standard of
conduct for "myriad different federal employees performing widely
disparate tasks."7 9 Just as the Court in Pickeringhad refrained from
laying down a general constitutional standard that would cover all
situations involving speech by government employees,"0 Justice
Rehnquist refused to require that Congress lay down a statutory
standard that would deal comprehensively with all instances of
questionable conduct by federal employees.8 ' Pointing out that the
Civil Service Commission had given some general interpretative
guides 2 and that the specific agency employer involved had pro" Id. at 1187.
" See id. at 1190.

" See text and notes at notes 104-07, 126-27 infra.

,1413 U.S. 134 (1974). Kennedy, a nonprobationary civil service employee, had been
dismissed from his position in the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) after accusing the
OEO Regional Director and a co-worker of attempting to bribe a potential OEO grantee. The
OEO charged that the statements were slanderous and that their utterance caused disharmony in the office to which Kennedy was assigned. Id. at 175 (White, J., concurring in part).
" For a discussion of the Court's due process holding, see text and notes at notes 151-58
infra.
" 416 U.S. at 158-63 (opinion of Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J.);
id. at 164 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J.); id. at 177 (White, J., concurring
in part).
'
N
"

Id. at 159.

See text at note 13 supra.
416 U.S. at 161. See also Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79

(1973).
11416 U.S. at 160; see id. at 171-72 & n.2 (White, J., concurring in part).
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vided for advisory assistance by its own general counsel's office if
an employee was uncertain as to the statute's meaning, 3 Justice
Rehnquist held that the "cause" standard was not so vague as to
be unconstitutional. Justice Rehnquist also held that the statute,
which was designed to give federal employees protection that they
had previously lacked rather than to impose sanctions for certain
misconduct, could not be interpreted to authorize discharge for constitutionally protected conduct;8 1 it was not overbroad.
Arnett would thus seem to limit the usefulness of the vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines in challenging sanctions for employment
related disclosures that have been imposed under broadly worded
rules. The government employer might argue that, as in Arnett,
greater specificity in defining sanctionable misconduct is impossible. In many cases involving general misconduct statutes, it might
also be possible to argue that the rule should be construed not to
apply at all to constitutionally protected speech. Muller and Bence,
however, give some indication of what protection might still be
available after Arnett. In Bence, the court emphasized the lack of
necessity for the vagueness of the "unbecoming a member" standard, pointing to the specifically enumerated forms of misconduct
that were also made grounds for sanction in the same rule in which
the catch-all category was stated. 5 It would seem that in most cases
involving rules promulgated by a particular agency or department,
in contrast with the general civil service statute considered in
Arnett, greater specificity would be possible and broadly worded
misconduct rules might more readily be held unconstitutionally
vague. Furthermore, when that greater susceptibility to specific
rule-making is exercised clearly to prohibit a broad range of speech
activities, as in Muller, the Arnett argument for interpreting a rule
to avoid an overbroad application will not be convincing. It would
seem, then, that there remain areas, especially those involving rules
of particular agencies and departments, in which overbreadth and
vagueness claims might protect employee disclosures even more
broadly than Pickering.
B.

Statutory Protections

Legislative enactments protecting the disclosing employee delineate somewhat more precisely the scope of executive discretion
Id. at 160.
Id. at 162.
Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1189 (7th Cir. 1974).
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in employment sanctions that may remain unrestricted by the constitutional doctrines. The statutes have the potential for addressing
narrower sets of circumstances more specifically, and thus are potentially capable of laying down the comprehensive standard that
the Supreme Court eschewed in Pickering. Legislatures might also
simply grant broader statutory protections for disclosing employees
than the first amendment requires.
One narrow area of federal employee disclosure-that involved
when an employee petitions Congress-is given strict statutory protection" against being "interfered with or denied" under section
7102 of title 5 of the United States Code." Enacted as part of the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act in 1912,88 the statute was originally intended
to reverse President Taft's "gag rule," which prohibited civil servants from communicating information concerning any legislative
matter to Congress without the consent of their department heads."
According to its sponsor, the Act's purpose was to counter the power
of executive officials "to withhold information and suppress the
' 90
truth or to conceal their official acts.
Neither Congress nor the state legislatures, however, have addressed the problem of fact disclosures specifically; the matter is
dealt with, for the most part, under generalized provisions that
encompass all categories of employee misbehavior and unfitness. As
a result, unpredictability and unequal treatment continue to plague
this area of public employee rights.
Judicial interpretations of section 7102 and its predecessor have
sketched the limits of the protection the statute provides. In 1961,
the District of Columbia federal district court granted summary
judgment for an employee seeking reinstatement after he was discharged for circulating a petition among his co-workers to be presented to Congress. 9' The court thought that the statute would pro"4This protection, of course, is in addition to that provided under the first amendment
guarantee of freedom to petition for redress of grievances. See text at notes 42-62 and note
47 supra.
" The right of employees, individually or collectively, to petition Congress or a
Member of Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a
committee or member thereof may not be interfered with or denied.
5 U.S.C. § 7102 (1970). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1970) (making intimidation of witnesses
in Congressional investigations punishable by substantial fine and imprisonment).
Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 652(d) (1964)).
Section 652(d) was later recodified as section 7102 in substantially identical terms. Act of
Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 523, amending 5 U.S.C. § 652(d) (1964) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (Supp. IV, 1969)).
" Exec. Order No. 1142, Nov. 26, 1909, reprinted in 48 CONG. REc. 4513 (1912).
48 CONG. REc. 10671 (1912) (remarks of Representative Lloyd).
Steck v. Connally, 199 F. Supp. 104, 105 (D.D.C. 1961).
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tect such activity even if the employee acted unreasonably or made
false statements in his petition,92 but also indicated that the government might interfere with the employee's petitioning if it could
show that "serious disruption of work and a substantial loss of time"
had occurred.13 The District of Columbia Circuit later affirmed, in
Turner v. Kennedy, 4 the discharge of a civil service employee who
had made "false, irresponsible and unjustified" statements in letters he had written to Congressmen, which were found by the Civil
Service Commission to have demonstrated his unsuitability for
employment and to have impaired the efficiency of his agency. One
judge dissented,9 5 criticizing the court's implicit deference to the
government's assertion of a broad limitation on the employee's statutory right to petition Congress,96 and suggested that the case
should have been remanded for the application of only the "actual
malice" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 7
As under the interpretation of Swaaley discussed above in the
context of the constitutional protection of petitions within agency
channels," this interpretation of section 7102 would provide potentially more protection for the disclosing employee than he would
receive under the Pickering rule. At least one commentator has
agreed with the Turner dissenter that section 7102 petitions should
be completely protected so long as the New York Times standard is
met; any discharge or sanction of an employee who petitions Congress should be based only on harm to governmental interests
caused by other actions of the employee which assertedly are likely
to exist in most instances.9 Support for this position is found both
in Congress' specific and unqualified mandate in the statute itself
92 The court noted that "[i]t
can be vexatious and annoying at times if the employee
acts unreasonably, but the statute contains no limitation." Id.

3 !d.

" 332 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir.) (mem.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964).

,' See id. (Fahy, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 305. The Civil Service Commission Board of Appeals and Review had held that
the statutory right to petition Congress could be lost if "the employee's conduct consituted
an abuse of the right and went beyond the scope of permissible activity contemplated by
Congress in enacting this legislation, and . . .thereby caused the agency immediate and
substantial harm." See YALE NoTE, supra note 55, at 1157 (quoting from the administrative
record submitted by the government to the court of appeals in Turner). As thus stated, of
course, the limitation does little more than define a balance between the interests of employees that Congress intended to protect and the interests of the government that might
be harmed by petition disclosures. Cf. notes 13-16 supra.
" 332 F.2d at 307, citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); see
text at note 11 supra.
,8See text and notes at notes 42-62 supra.
" YALE NoTE, supra note 55, at 1169; see Turner v. Kennedy, 332 F.2d 304, 307 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964) (Fahy, J., dissenting).
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and in the argument that petitions directed to Congress are generally less likely to affect governmental interests in loyalty, discipline
and harmony than are public statements.1/°
No court has yet adopted this broad interpretation of the pro10 2
tection afforded by section 7102.101 In Ruderer v. United States,
the most recent case to consider the infrequently invoked statute,
the Court of Claims was required to go no further than to indicate
the lowest common denominator of the opinions in Turner, stating
in dicta that section 7102 at least did not provide an unlimited
privilege for knowingly false and malicious statements.1 13 If this
were held to be the exclusive limitation on petitions to Congress,
section 7102 would provide potentially broader protection for a narrow class of employee disclosures than Pickering itself would require.
The statutory guide for treating the remainder of federal disclosures not taking the form of petitions to Congress is found in another
part of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, now codified as sections 7501(a)
and 7512(a) of title 5 of the United States Code.104 Those sections
provide, respectively, that no civil service employee shall be re1 5 civil service
moved or suspended and no "preference eligible""
'0
employee shall be subjected to "adverse action,"' except "for such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." '
Although the Supreme Court held in the Arnett case that this
standard was not unconstitutionally vague in light of the vast variety of federal civil service employees and job situations for which it
was intended to provide protection,108 the cause requirement of
I" YALE NOTE, supra note 55, at 1167-70. The note argues that harm to interests in coworker harmony and employee discipline are even less likely than would be true for intraagency petitions, which may involve direct confrontation with a culpable superior or going
over the head of such a superior within the agency with disruptive repercussions.
"I But cf. Swaaley v. United States, 376 F.2d 857, 863-65 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (applying the
New York Times standard to a petition not covered by section 7102, but suggesting that the
Turner decision was not inconsistent).
102412 F.2d 1285 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970).
"I Id. at 1292. The court found that the employee's discharge was based on statements
other than those he had made in the few letters he had sent to Congress. Id.
'' 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501(a), 7512(a) (1970).
' Preference eligible employees are those who have completed probationary or trial
periods of employment, but do not include cabinet members and others whose appointment
is required to be confirmed by the Senate. Id. § 7511(1).
I" Adverse actions include removal, suspension for more than 30 days, furlough without
pay, and reduction in rank or pay. Id. § 7511(2).
' Id. §§ 7501(a), 7512(a). The cause requirement does not apply to dismissals of employees deemed "necessary in the interests of national security" by an agency head. Id.
§§ 7501(c), 7512(c), 7532(a).
"' See text at note 78 supra. Justice Marshall, dissenting, felt that the standard was

The University of Chicago Law Review

[42:530

sections 7501(a) and 7512(a) adds little to the definition of the scope
of protected employee disclosures. In holding that section 7501(a)
was not overbroad on its face, the Court in Arnett indicated that it
could not be interpreted as justifying dismissal for constitutionally
protected speech, and thus that it provided no less protection than
the first amendment under Pickering.' It seems unlikely that
section 7501(a) itself expands the scope of substantive protection,
however, since harm to governmental interests that would justify
dismissal of a disclosing employee under Pickeringwould seem always to satisfy the "promote the efficiency of the service" standard
as well.
Nor does the statute by itself provide guidelines for identifying
the particular governmental interests that might outweigh a federal
employee's first amendment interests in a Pickering-typebalancing.
Sections 7501 and 7512 provide the general standard for sanctionable misconduct of all sorts; the task of providing more particularized
standards for specific conduct, including employee disclosures, is
left to the Civil Service Commission and the employer agencies
themselves." 0 These agencies, of course, cannot perform the function of the courts by pre-balancing the interests involved in making
or preventing certain disclosures and declaring some to be outside
the scope of an employee's constitutional rights. But agency regulations can serve the important function of identifying specific governmental interests that might justify restrictions on employee disclosures in particular areas. Such regulations can provide some advance notice to employees as to the consequences of disclosure
deemed most harmful by their employers, and can promote efficient
operation of the agencies by allowing them to prevent the most
harmful disclosures by clear rules rather than to assert their interests only in justifying sanctions imposed for unprotected disclosures
after the harm has occurred.
The adequacy of current regulations in performing this function
of setting comprehensive and detailed standards is questionable.
The Civil Service Commission regulations that might be applicable
in the case of an employee disclosure do not focus specifically on the
disclosure problem. They first repeat the general standard of section
7501(a),"' including among the possible sufficient "causes" for disunnecessarily vague and overbroad and that it would chill the exercise of an employee's
speech rights. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 227-31 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' Of course, the statute could be challenged as unconstitutionally applied in a particular instance of sanction for an employee's disclosure under Pickering.
21 Cf. Leonard v. Douglas, 321 F.2d 749, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
" 5 C.F.R. § 752.104(a) (1975).
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missal a "reasonable doubt" as to the employee's loyalty to the
government."12 In a separate part of the regulations, certain minimum standards of conduct for government employees, which are to
be implemented by regulations of each agency, are set out."' Among
the actions proscribed in this part by regulation 735.201(a) are any
that might result in, or create the appearance of:
(a) Using public office for private gain;. . . (c) Impeding Government efficiency or economy; . . . (e) Making a Government
decision outside official channels; or (f) Affecting adversely the
confidence of the public in the integrity of the Government.",
Each of these rules might be applicable, under various circumstances, to an employee who has made a public disclosure of wrongdoing
by his agency employer. But they are still only general standards for
all civil service employees, not directed specifically at the problem
of disclosures, and they do little to advance the particularized identification of government interests in restricting employee disclosures.
Although it might be impossible to define in advance all situations in which such governmental interests might be injured, further
refinement is both feasible and necessary."' The Administrative
Conference has suggested that the Civil Service Commission's
Board of Appeals and Review, which hears appeals from adverse
actions imposed under section 7512(a)," 81 make its decisions available to other agencies and employees and to the public." 7 This
opening of the Commission's currently secret body of precedents
would provide the federal employee with more explicit notice of the
types of behavior, including disclosures, previously upheld as
grounds for dismissal.
A potentially more comprehensive method of identifying
restriction-justifying governmental interests is for each of the
"IId.; see id. § 731.201(f). The regulations also specifically exclude "partisan political
reasons" as sufficient cause for dismissal. Id. § 752.104(b).
"' See id. § 735.101, (stating the purpose of the standards as assuring "the proper performance of the Government business and the maintenance of confidence by citizens in their
Government" by avoiding "misconduct and conflicts of interest").
"I Id. § 735.201a. See also id. § 735.209 (prohibiting "dishonest . . . or notoriously
disgraceful . . . conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the Government"); id. § 735.206
(prohibiting use of inside information to further a private interest).
"I See 2 ADMIN. CONF. RECOMM. & REP. 1054 (1972). Justice Marshall disagreed with the
implication of the plurality opinions in Arnett v. Kennedy that further refinement is impossible. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 230 n.32 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (1970).
", The Board has done so in more than 600 cases of various types of misconduct. 2 ADMIN.
CONF. RECOMM. & REP. 1054 (1972).
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agency employers to promulgate its own narrower regulations. Ideally, such regulations would take the form of categorizations of occupational duties and corresponding qualities of those duties relevant
to assessing the impact of certain disclosures. Each agency, by virtue of its relatively finite number of job classifications and occupational duties, would be better able than a court faced with isolated
employee disclosures or the Civil Service Commission faced with a
much wider array of job situations to begin to give some definition
to the limits of permissible employee disclosure. Drawing up a truly
comprehensive set of explicit standards is probably not feasible,
given the complex matrix formed by variable job situations on the
one hand and types of disclosures on the other. But there is certainly
some potential in this approach for putting the government employee who contemplates disclosing agency wrongdoing on more
solid ground.
The response of the federal agencies to this need for refining the
general standards for employee conduct is varied. Some agencies go
no further than to reproduce almost verbatim the general Civil Service Commission regulations.' Others have promulgated regulations
dealing specifically with narrow areas of employee disclosure in
which special problems may arise."' But the problems of disclosure
of agency wrongdoing and of critical public comments by agency
employees are largely left to general standards like those of Civil
Service Commission regulation 735.201(a).' 20 Some agencies bolster
the "adversely affecting public confidence" standard by asserting
that agency interests in maintaining such confidence are especially
2
high. '
Two provisions that appear in most regulations are important
for assessing the sufficiency of each agency's resolution of the disclosure problem. The first, promulgated by each agency under the
express direction of Civil Service Commission regulation
735.105(b), 22 provides that certain agency personnel are available to
give "authoritative advice and guidance" as to the interpretation of
" The FTC's regulations, for example, merely incorporate the Civil Service Commission's basic regulations. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §§ 0.735-10, 0.735-15, 0.735-18 (1975) (reproducing the language of 5 id. §§ 735.201a, 735.206, 735.209 (1975), respectively).
"'

See, e.g., 28 id. § 50.2 (1974) (Justice Department regulation setting out policy on

release of information relating to criminal and civil proceedings).
" See, e.g., 10 id. § 0.735-49a (1975) (AEC); 16 id. § 0.735-10 (1975) (FTC); 24 id. §
0.735-202 (1974) (HUD); 28 id. § 45.735-2(c) (1974) (Department of Justice); 45 id. § 73.735305 (1974) (HEW).
"I See, e.g., 10 id. § 0.735-1 (1975) (AEC); 24 id. § 0.735-201(b)(i) (1974) (HUD).
'2 5 id. § 735.105(b) (1975).
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any of the employee conduct regulations.123 This makes it possible
for the agency to give some advance warning to employees that
agency interests asserted generally under the regulations would be
harmed in the specific circumstances of a particular disclosure. The
system may deter some employees from seeking an advisory interpretation if it requires them, for example, to disclose the wrongdoing
of a superior in order for the counselor to determine whether further
disclosure may be cause for the employee's own dismissal or other
sanction. But this takes on elements of a petition, and the agency
may have an interest in channeling contemplated disclosures
through an agency superior rather than making rules comprehensive
enough for an employee to judge the effects of a disclosure himself.
The second important provision of many agencies' regulations
is their express incorporation of the Code of Ethics for Government
Service adopted by the Eighty-Fifth Congress.124 One of the tenets
of that Code is that government employees should "[e]xpose corruption wherever discovered. 1 ' 25 By incorporating this provision
among its own standards for employee conduct, a federal agency
explicitly recognizes the public interest in encouraging its employees to make disclosures of agency wrongdoing. The employee is thus
given notice that there is a strong interest, and one weighted with
the interest of the public, to be balanced against this agency's selfidentified interests in nondisclosure.
State government employees are given substantive protection
against unjustified sanction for disclosures of employer wrongdoing
under a variety of statutory schemes. Most states either prescribe a
general standard of "cause" or "just cause"' 2 or specify reasons, in
the language of the statute or in state civil service commission regulations, that may constitute adequate cause for removal of a state
employee. 12 7 Thus, the same potential for clarifying the balancing of
'1

See, e.g., 10 id. §§ 0.735-3(b)-(h) (1975) (AEC); 16 id. § 0.735.5 (1975) (FTC); 24 id.

§ 0.735-104(b) (1974) (HUD); 28 id. § 45.735-26(b) (1974) (Department of Justice); 45 id. §
73.735-104 (1974) (HEW).
2I H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REc. 13556-57 (1958) (reprinted
at 72 Stat. B12 (1958)). "The resolution creates no new law." 104 CONG. REC. 13556 (1958)
(remarks of Senator Johnson). See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 0.735-3(a) (1975) (AEC); 28 id. § 45.7352(d) (1974) (Department of Justice); cf. 24 id. § 0.735-201(b)(3) (1974) (HUD).
125H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9, 104 CoNG. REc. 13556 (198) (reprinted
at 72 Stat. B12 (1958)).
'n See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 19500 (West 1963) ("cause"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §

5-240(c) (1957) ("good of the service");

ILL.

REv.

STAT. ANN.

ch. 24, § 10-1-18 (Smith-Hurd

Supp. 1974) ("cause"); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 31, § 43(a) (1973) ("just cause"); PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.807 (Supp. 1974) ("just cause"); cf. MICH. CONST. art. 11, § 5 (West 1967) (conferring
right of appeal on "aggrieved" employees).
'2 See, e.g., ALASKA STATS. § 14.20.170 (1971) (specifies and defines incompetency, im-
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interests required by Pickeringexists for state law as for federal law,
and the responses are likewise varied. 2 '
Generally, then, the substantive rights of government employees to disclose agency wrongdoing are not expanded by state and
federal statutes. Some of the agency regulations promulgated under
statutes prohibiting adverse employment actions other than for
cause may serve to give an employee contemplating disclosure some
advance notice of the agency's self-perceived interests in nondisclosure. The balancing of the employee's interests against those of his
employer, however, must be undertaken during administrative proceedings through which the employer imposes sanctions for the
disclosure or during judicial proceedings through which the employee challenges those sanctions.
II.

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE.

The efficacy of various substantive protections for disclosing
employees depends in the first instance on the procedures through
which they may be vindicated. Many of the notable advances in
public employee rights have occurred in this area, and procedural
protections remain a central issue in efforts to expand them even
further. The factors that make the procedural aspect a focal point
of employee rights are largely pragmatic. From the viewpoint of the
courts, the procedures by which the government seeks to restrain
speech are clearer objects of judicial scrutiny than the form of
speech restrained, and the validity of a particular restraint might
turn on the safeguards afforded in imposing it. 2 Legislatures may
attempt to avoid some of the complexities of describing substantive
guidelines in detail by providing extensive administrative and judicial procedures by which general substantive standards are to be
morality, and substantial noncompliance with rules, regulations, laws and by-laws as exclusive grounds); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §75 (McKinney 1973) (incompetency and misconduct as
exclusive grounds). The New Jersey statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 71:111.15-2 (1960), provides
that the state's civil service commission shall enumerate the reasons "which shall be considered just cause." Despite the mandate for a closed list, the commission has left its category
of causes open-ended by prescribing that "removals may be made for sufficient causes other
than those listed. . ." N.J. ADMIN. CODE §4:1-16.9(a) (Supp. 1973). See also OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 1124.34 (Supp. 1974) (includes nine specific grounds for removal and "any other
failure of good behavior, or any other acts of misfeasance (or) malfeasance ... ").
121 Alaska is one state that specifically addresses the problem of employee disclosure, but
it only codifies the holding in Pickering.ALASKA STATS. 1 §14.20.095 (1971). Most other states
handle the problem under a general standard such as insubordination or misconduct. See
statutes cited at note 127 supra.
I" See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 521 (1958). Compare Kuntz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951), with Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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implemented. Finally, the nature and timing of the procedure by
which a government employee is entitled to challenge his dismissal
or other sanction may affect his chances of succeeding and his ability to undertake the challenge in light of the costs involved in doing
so.

Thus, a description of the procedures that the government
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must follow in imposing employment sanctions is an important part
of a survey of the protections provided for government employee
disclosures.
A.

Constitutional Protections.

The constitutional guarantee of procedural due process may
only be invoked by persons who are deprived of "life, liberty, or
property" by actions of the state or federal government.131 Thus,
before the due process clause is applicable at all, a government
employee must show that the sanctions imposed on him for his
disclosure actually entailed a deprivation of his liberty or of a property interest.
The Supreme Court's opinions in the companion cases of Board
of Regents v. Roth132 and Perry v. Sindermann3 3 provide the basis
for definitions of liberty and property to be applied in considering a
due process claim. Both cases involved state college teachers whose
contracts had not been renewed at their expiration dates, allegedly
because of the teachers' public criticisms of their employers' policies.' 34 Roth had been employed for fewer than the four years required to gain tenure. The Court reversed the lower court's ruling
that the college was bound by the Constitution to provide him with
a hearing and reasons as to its failure to rehire him. It held that Roth
had not shown a deprivation of his liberty, which might have consisted either of injury to his reputation in the community because of
the nature of the reasons the college asserted for his not being rehired or of foreclosure of future employment opportunities because
of the fact that he was not rehired.13 Nor did he establish the deprivation of a cognizable property interest, which the Court held could
only be based upon an entitlement to reemployment that was supported by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an indeCf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 585 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
,' U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
"

408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 568 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 595 (1972).
'a Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
"

"
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pendent source.""' Having thus disposed of Roth's procedural due
process claim, the Court remanded his case for trial on the issue of
whether the college's failure to rehire him had violated his first
amendment rights.'37
Sindermann, on the other hand, had been employed under four
successive one-year contracts at a state college that lacked a formal
tenure system. The Supreme Court held that Sindermann's due
process claim had improperly been dismissed before trial, since he
might have established a legitimate claim of entitlement to reemployment by proving his allegations of an informal tenure system
based on the policies and practices of the college.' 38 The Court emphasized as well that Sindermann's first amendment claim was
wholly independent of his due process claim, and that the existence
of a property interest was irrelevant to the sufficiency of a claim
3
brought under Pickering.11
The due process clause may also be applicable under Roth and
Sindermann to government-imposed sanctions other than outright
dismissal or refusal to rehire. In Bottcher v. FloridaDepartment of
Agriculture and Consumer Services,' for example, a chemist was
given a conditional rating (indicating poor or substandard performance) by her superiors, allegedly in retaliation for disclosures she
had made concerning inadequate testing methods used by her employer agency.' Since the rating constituted an impediment to
Bottcher's professional reputation and future advancement, the district court said, it could not be imposed without the procedural
protections guaranteed by the due process clause.'
Beyond the question of whether the due process clause is applicable in the case of a particular sanction is the difficult question
of what specific procedures are mandated when the clause does
apply. That question must be resolved by balancing the government's interest in expeditious sanction of the disclosing employee
against the interest of the employee in avoiding the summary impo3
sition of such a sanction.1
lu Id. at 577.
I' See id. at 568 & n.5, 574-75 & n.14, 579.
238 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972).
"I Id. at 596-98. Despite the fact that a nontenured employee might have no entitlement
to reemployment, allowing the government to deny the benefit of reemployment because of
the employee's exercise of first amendment rights would be to allow the government to restrict
indirectly what it is forbidden from restricting directly by positive sanctions. See id. at 597.
10 361 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Fla. 1973).
Id. at 1128.
,42Id. at 1128-29.
" See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers,
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Several significant features of government employees' procedural due process rights have been considered by the courts, and the
few that are most relevant to an employee's dismissal for disclosing
agency wrongdoing are worth noting. In Fitzgerald v. Hampton,'
the District of Columbia Circuit held that a former federal employee's termination hearing was required to be open to the press
and public, in accordance with his request."' The court first held
that the plaintiff's statutory employment rights were within the
liberty and property concept of the fifth amendment,"' and then
interpreted the due process guarantee as requiring that the hearing
be open.1 7 Exposure was of great consequence in this case because
of the public interest in the circumstances surrounding the abolition
of Fitzgerald's position after his testimony to the Senate-House
Joint Economic Committee exposed the cost overruns of the Air
Force C-5A program. 8
The timing of evidentiary hearings has perhaps an even more
significant effect than openness on the willingness of an employee
to make a protected disclosure. Where the employee faces the probability of months of being off the payroll even if he is ultimately
successful in challenging a dismissal action, he will be deterred from
exercising his statutory and constitutional rights of expression to
their fullest extent.' The timing of the required hearing was one of
the major due process issues that split the Supreme Court in Arnett
v. Kennedy. 15° The three-member plurality in Arnett, considering a
due process challenge to the statutory procedures provided for ad5
verse actions imposed by federal agencies under section 7501(a),' '
held that the property interest in continued employment created by
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
'" 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
"
Id. at 766. The Commission's present position is that the examiner may still deny the
employee's request for a public hearing on his appeal if the agency objects and if, in his
determination, a closed hearing is "in the best public interest." 5 C.F.R. § 772.307(c)(5)
(1975).
'" 467 F.2d at 762.
"' The court noted that the administrative hearing was of a quasi-judicial character, and
that due process in such hearings does not yield to administrative convenience or expediency.
Id. at 766-67; see Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 304-05 (1937).
"I A fully descriptive commentary on this case is found in WHISTLE BLOWING note 1 supra
at 39-54.
"I More than 75 percent of adverse actions contested within employer agencies require
longer to decide than the 60 days prescribed by Commission regulations, and 5 percent are
in process for longer than a year. In most agencies, the employee is off the payroll throughout
the appeals process. 2 ADMIN. CONF. REcoMM. & REP. 1016 (1972).
"
416 U.S. 134 (1974); see text and notes at notes 76-78 supra.
151 See text and notes at notes 104-07 supra.
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the statute was conditioned by the procedural limitations set out in
the same section; since Kennedy had been discharged under those
procedures, he had not been deprived of a property interest and
15
therefore had no due process claim. 1
The six other members of the Court rejected this analysis, but
differed as to what timing the due process clause required once it
was held to be applicable. Justices Powell and Blackmun, viewing
the hardships sustained by a discharged employee in awaiting the
hearing that he would receive in appealing his dismissal as uncompelling, 53 would have held that due process does not require an
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissal, and thus voted to uphold the
statute.' 4 Justice White felt, after balancing the agency's and employee's interests, that a prior hearing was required, but that the
statutory provision for pretermination notice and for the employee
to respond in writing satisfied that constitutional requirement.'
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissenters,'56 evaluated the interests differently from Justices Powell and White and concluded that
the failure of the statute to provide a pretermination evidentiary
hearing violated the employee's due process rights.'5 7 The hardship
imposed on the discharged employee by the delay that occurred
before he would receive a hearing on appeal, according to Justice
Marshall, was potentially devastating.'58 He found the government's
asserted interests in expeditious dismissal of troublesome employees, on the other hand, to be contrary to its actual experience."'
A final element of a government employee's procedural due
process rights that seems quite significant in the context of employee disclosures was also raised in Justice White's opinion in
Arnett. Although he thought that the statutory procedures satisfied
due process requirements as far as they went, he would have affirmed the lower court's invalidation of the particular dismissal on
15 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-52, 155 (1974) (opinion of Rehnquist, J., joined
by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J.). The plurality also found that there was no denial of liberty
in violation of Kennedy's due process rights, since a hearing afforded by administrative
appeal provided him with an opportunity to clear his name and reputation. Id. at 157.
113Id. at 169 (Powell, J., concurring in part); cf. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83-84,
90-91 (1974).
416 U.S. at 171.
" Id. at 195-96.
15 Justice Douglas joined Justice Marshall's opinion, but also filed a separate dissent in
which he argued that any dismissal based on an employee's critical speech violated his first
amendment rights and that no governmental interests should be permitted to outweigh those
rights. Id. at 203-06 (Douglas J., dissenting).
157Id. at 226-27 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
'' Id. at 220-22.
, Id. at 224-26.
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the ground that Kennedy was not provided an impartial hearing
officer.' Since the agency officer who made the dismissal determination was the very superior whom Kennedy had accused of attempted bribery, "the risk and the appearance" of bias were so great
that Justice White would have found a denial of due process.'61 A
similar problem would arise to some degree in every disclosure of
agency wrongdoing. When the employee's dismissal is predicated on
personally slanderous disclosures against the agency official who
will decide whether the dismissal is justified under the applicable
statutes, Justice White's position seems quite correct. Even when
the employee's disclosure alleges improper actions of persons other
than the hearing officer himself, a similar question of partiality
might arise; any agency hearing on the issue of whether public criticism of the agency should justify sanctions against the critical employee might be seen as likely to give undue weight to the agency's
own interests.1 6 2 But labelling such general prejudice a due process
violation is probably appropriate only where the hearing officer is
personally involved, as he was in Arnett. In any other case, the
agency's assertion of its own interests over the employee's in the
administrative hearing is permissible as long as the employee can
vindicate his first amendment rights by bringing a suit for reinstatement or other remedy. The court will undertake the ultimate balancing of agency interests against employee's first amendment
rights." 3
B.

Statutory Protections

The basic procedural protections afforded tenured federal employees by statute are provided in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act and are
expanded in some cases by regulations promulgated by the agencies
themselves. When an agency proposes to sanction an employee
under section 7502(a) or 7512(a),164 the employee must be provided
with notice of the action, a specification of reasons or charges, an
opportunity to answer the notice in writing (and in person if the
adverse action is against a "preference eligible" employee), and
notice of the agency's final determination.'6 5 The Supreme Court
upheld this procedure against a due process claim in Arnett, with
Id. at 202 (White, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 196-99.
12 Cf. Ring v. Schlesinger, 502 F.2d 479, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

",
'6I

16, Id.
''
"

See text and notes at notes 104-07 supra.
5 U.S.C. §§ 7501(b), 7512(b) (1970).
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two Justices relying on the provision of a full evidentiary hearing on
administrative appeal'66 to find it constitutional.1 67 But despite the
fact that the Court held the statutory procedure constitutionally
sufficient, some agencies have expanded the procedural rights of
their employees by regulation. At least nine agencies, for example,
provide for a full evidentiary hearing prior to an employee's dismissal. 6 " The Administrative Conference has recommended that
such pretermination hearings be required universally, but that the
agency be permitted to reassign the employee or place him on administrative leave with pay when it determines that his continued
employment pending the hearing would adversely affect department operations or morale. 6 ' This proposal thus gives full credence
to the interests of the government in expeditious removal of disruptive employees and to the interests of employees in being able to
have their defenses to a dismissal considered in a full hearing without sacrificing their livelihood pending an appeal. Since both sides
are accommodated, the due process balancing on which the Court
split on Arnett would be avoided.
Another aspect of a federal employee's procedural protections
that the Supreme Court has recently considered is the availability
of injunctive relief against improper agency action. In Sampson v.
Murray,'70 the Court held that an injunction was properly denied a
probationary employee who sought to enjoin her discharge on the
ground that it was accomplished in violation of the Civil Service
Commission's procedural regulations. 7' The Court's justification for
5 U.S.C. § 7701 (1970); 5 C.F.R. § 772.307 (1975).
,e See text at notes 153-54 supra.
'' Those nine agencies, which include the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, and the Civil Service Commission itself,
account for no more than ten percent of the total cases of employees contesting adverse
actions taken against them. 2 ADMIN. CONF. REcoMM. & REP. 1016 n.38 (1972).
,"I Admin. Conf. of the United States, 1972-73 REPORT, Recommendation 72-8 (1973).
Presently, agencies may place an employee in a nonduty status with pay only insofar as is
necessary to effect his suspension during the pretermination notice period, and for a maximum of five days. 5 C.F.R. § 752.202(c)(3) (1975).
The committee also proposes that employees subject to adverse action have the right to
elect a hearing that is open to the public, except where an employing agency can establish
good cause for keeping the hearing closed.
The public has an interest in monitoring the administration of justice at all levels of
government. . . Except in rare cases involving national security. . . [employing agencies and the Civil Service Commission] have no legitimate interest in preserving the
secrecy of their hearing process or the facts they produce.
1 ADMIN. CONF. RECOMM. & REP. 1061-62 (1972).
,7o415 U.S. 61 (1974).
Murray, a provisional GSA employee, claimed that her discharge was based at least
in part on conduct prior to her federal employment, and that she was denied an opportunity
'"
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its holding was that any loss occasioned by the plaintiff's being off
the payroll while awaiting an appeal could be remedied under the
Back Pay Act, which permits recovery of pay lost because of
"unjustified or unwarranted personnel action" 17 2 and that plaintiff
1 3
Murray had, therefore, shown no irreparable injury.
Almost all state statutes that protect public employees from
sanction other than for cause also provide procedural protection of
the substantive right for state employees; requirements of notice of
a proposed adverse action and the right to a hearing are the most
common features. Although ambiguous terms are often used to describe the causes that may justify sanction, several states have had
the foresight to require that the notice of sanction describe the reasons for the action with specificity. 74 Consequently, the employee
who wishes to prove that the motivation for the state's action
against him is unlawful is in a better position to do so when the
notice is of the form required by these statutes.
Several state legislatures have also considered the nature of the
hearing to be provided, and have granted important concessions to
the employee. Statutes in at least four states require that the hearing be held before the effective date of the termination, 175 and as
many allow for opening the hearing to the public. 176 Two states,
perhaps out of cognizance of the public interests in diminishing
abuse of the power of removal, provide that the state civil service
77
commission may investigate a removal upon its own initiative.
to file an answer to the notice of proposed adverse action, as provided by 5 C.F.R. §315.805(a)
(1975). 415 U.S. at 64-65.
5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1970).
415 U.S. at 90-91.
17,See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §14.20.180(a)(1971)(a statement of cause and a complete bill
of particulars); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 1 § 5-240(c) (1969) (the reasons for dismissal set forth
in sufficient detail to indicate cause); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24 §10-1-18 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1975) (the specific improper or illegal act alleged to have been committed); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 31 §43(a)(1973)(reasons specifically given); N.J. STAT. ANN. 11:15-3 (1960)(removing
party completes form listing cause constituting grounds for removal and act consituting such
cause and delivers same to employee). Others are not as demanding. See, e.g., OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §124.34 (Supp. 1973)(copy of order of sanction, stating reasons therefore); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 741.950 (Supp. 1975) (reasons for the action).
"I ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.180(c) (1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24 § 10-1-18 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 31 § 43(a) (1973); NEW YORK CIV. SERV. LAWS § 75
(McKinney 1973). Pennsylvania ameliorates the lack of a right to pretermination hearing by
specifying a right to back pay. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 741.951 (Supp. 1975).
"I ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.180(b)(1) (1971) (public hearing upon employee's request);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 31 § 43(b) (1973) (public hearing upon request of either party); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 11:15-5 (1960)(investigation, inquiry or hearing shall be open to public); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71 § 741.951 (Supp. 1975) (public hearing).
"I N.J. STAT. ANN. 11:15-4(1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 741.951 (Supp. 1975).
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Massachusetts law even provides a schedule of reimbursements
whereby employees may recover virtually all legal expenses in defending against an unwarranted state employment action."'8
The degree of procedural protections conferred by state statutes
often exceeds that provided by the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, but the
gap may be narrowed to the extent that agency regulations and
judicial decisions have broadened the rights which appear in the
federal Act itself. The state pattern of explicitly describing the safeguards of the dismissal procedure in dismissal statutes has the advantages of uniformity and accessibility. Thus, state legislation in
this area both expands the protections afforded government employees and may improve the awareness of employees as to how and
when they may be invoked.
CONCLUSION

Public employees who disclose the improper actions or policies
of their agency employers may rightfully claim a strong public interest in support of their exercise of constitutional and statutory rights
to speak out without retribution. The benefit to the public of their
use of their special expertise and access in blowing the whistle on
governmental misfeasance is potentially great. But there is a different public interest-that of efficient operation of government agencies-on the other side. Agency employers could be unduly impeded
in performing their necessary function if an unqualified right of
immunized disclosure were established.
This comment has attempted to indicate the scope of the disclosing employee's protection by surveying the constitutional and
statutory provisions that are relevant to accommodating the conflicting interests. The employee's first amendment right to freedom
of speech under Pickering is only to be balanced against the interests the government asserts, with the balance to be struck by the
courts in each case. The first amendment guarantee of a right of
petition, the first amendment-based prohibition against vague and
overbroad rules, and the statutory right of federal employees to
petition Congress all may describe objectively broader protection for
the employee in certain circumstances where the counter-balancing
interests are more predictable. Finally, although statutes and regulations that prescribe general substantive and procedural standards
for employment sanctions and the constitutional guarantee of cer,78MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 31, § 43(h) (1973). Unlike some states, the Massachusetts act is
applicable even where the employee's office or position is abolished. Id. § 43(a).
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tain procedural protections cannot preempt the ultimate resolution
of conflicting interests, they do serve to clarify and make more fair
the initial assertion of the government's interests in restricting an
employee's disclosures.
Mitchell J. Lindauer

